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We compare behavior across students and professional traders
from the Chicago Board of Trade in a classic Allais paradox
experiment. Our experiment tests whether independence, a nec-
essary condition in expected utility theory, is systematically vio-
lated. We ﬁnd that both students and professionals exhibit some
behavior consistent with the Allais paradox, but the data pattern
does suggest that the trader population falls prey to the Allais
paradox less frequently than the student population.
Allais paradox  experiments  futures traders
E
xpected utility (EU) theory remains the dominant ap-
proach for modeling risky decision-making and has been
considered the major paradigm in decision making since
World War II, being used predictively in economics and
finance, prescriptively in management science, and descrip-
tively in psychology (1). Furthermore, EU is the common
economic approach for addressing public policy decision-
making: a comparison of the expected costs and benefits of a
proposed public policy implicitly assumes that economic
agents maximize EU.
The mathematical form of EU stems back to the 17th
century during the development of modern probability theory.
Mathematicians Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat assumed
that the attractiveness of a lottery offering payoff (x1,...,xn)
with probabilities (p1,...,pn) was simply given by its expected
value x   xi pi. However, the fact that individuals evaluate
more than expected value was dramatically illustrated by
Nicholas Bernoulli in 1728 by using an example known today
as the St. Petersburg paradox.f
Daniel Bernoulli (2), who was Nicholas’s cousin, offered a
solution to this paradox. Specifically, he outlined intuitive
reasons why individuals would pay only a small amount for a
game with an infinite mathematical expectation. He argued
that a $100 gain was not necessarily worth more than twice as
muchasagainof$50,suggestingthatindividualsmaximizeEU
rather than expected monetary value. The utility function U(x)
he proposed was logarithmic, which exhibited diminishing
increases in utility for equal increments in wealth and did, in
fact, show that the EU is indeed finite in such cases. [Bernoulli
proposed the following function: U(x)  bln[(  x)].
dU(x)dx  b(  x), which is inversely proportional to
wealth. Moreover, d2U(x)dx2  0.]
The work of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
(3) proved that several basic axioms guarantee that there exists
a utility index such that the ordering of lotteries based on
their expected utilities fully coincides with the person’s ac-
tual preferences.g Although EU represents a convenient and
tractable approach to measuring utility, it continues to be the
focus of much theoretical, empirical, and experimental re-
search simply because EU theory is often shown to be sys-
tematically violated under certain conditions. Indeed, in
experimental investigations, the weight of evidence suggests
that student subjects make decisions inconsistent with EU
theory (see refs. 4–9). Despite finding violations of EU, the
theory has been shown to be a ‘‘pretty good’’ approximation to
individuals’ true preferences. Indeed, according to some re-
searchers, learning and familiarization with the decision tasks
are required before true preferences settle on the genuine
underlying form (10).
Understanding whether experienced agents, like profes-
sional traders, make similar decisions is important in light of
some recent studies (e.g. refs. 11 and 12) that find that market
anomalies in the realm of riskless decision-making are atten-
uated among economic players who have intense market
experience.h To provide a stringent test of EU theory, we
follow Starmer and Sugden (7) and use choice problems that
correspond very closely to one of the classic forms of the Allais
paradox (18), the ‘‘common consequence effect,’’ a test of the
independence assumption in EU theory.i
In our experimental investigation of EU theory (specifically
the test of the independence assumption), we find that both
students and professional traders from the Chicago Board of
Trade (CBOT) exhibit behavior consistent with the Allais
paradox (thus violating EU theory), but the data pattern does
suggest that the trader population falls prey to the Allais
paradox slightly less frequently than the student population.
Furthermore, we find that professional traders behave in
accordance with the reduction principle (reducing compound
lotteries to simple ones via the calculus of probabilities (see
ref. 20), whereas students did not exhibit this tendency.
Abbreviations: EU, expected utility; CBOT, Chicago Board of Trade.
dTo whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: jlist@arec.umd.edu.
fThe St. Petersburg paradox is as follows: Imagine someone offers to toss a coin repeatedly
until it comes up tails, and to reward you $1 if this happens on the very ﬁrst toss, $2 if it
takes two tosses, $4 if it takes three tosses, $8 for four tosses, etc. What is the largest sure
gain you would be willing to forego in order to undertake a single play of the game?
Because the gamble offers 1/2 chance of winning $1, 1/4 of winning $2, etc., the expected
value is (1/2)  $1  (1/4)  $2  (1/8)  $4  1/2  1/2  1/2  .  1/2  $, so it should
be preferred to any ﬁnite gain. However, it is clear that very few individuals would forego
more than a moderate amount for a one-shot play.
gSpeciﬁcally, if a person’s preferences satisfy three axioms (ordering, continuity, and
independence), it is appropriate to model his behavior as if he were maximizing EU. For
a more complete discussion of the origin of EU theory and a discussion of the axioms, see
Schoemaker (1).
hChristensen-Szalanski and Beach (13) make an even stronger argument, noting that the
experimental literature using students is biased (see also ref. 14). Their main contention
is that experimental ﬁndings of major anomalies have largely used student subjects,
whereas those few studies that have employed professionals have usually reported
performance more in line with mainstream theory. This point is strengthened given that
there are numerous reasons to suspect that professional behavior may differ from non-
professionalbehaviorduetotraining,regulation,etc.(15,16).Also,seeList(17)fortheuse
of experienced players in ﬁeld experiments testing market theory.
iBecause the only difference between pair wise sets of safe and risky options that are
presented to agents (the usual set up for testing the ‘‘common consequence effect’’) are
common to each respective lottery, EU theory suggests that either all safe lotteries, or all
risky lotteries, are picked in all lottery choices (or indifference is shown). A common
consequence effect is manifest if choices switch systematically between the riskier and
safer options. Readers are directed to Machina’s (6, 19) pictorial representation of this
scenario. Indeed, Machina’s use of probability triangles popularized the concept to the
extent that the representation is sometimes referred to as the ‘‘Machina Triangle.’’
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One important violation of EU’s independence assumption is
the Allais paradox.j Indeed, a survey conducted by Allais in
1952 showed that the majority of real decision makers order
risky prospects in a way that is inconsistent with the postulate
that choices are independent of irrelevant alternatives, thus
casting doubt on the validity of EU theory. However, it is
precisely this postulate that permits economists to represent
preferences over risky prospects as a linear function of the
utilities of the basic outcomes, and hence have the ability to
measure utility. A classic paper by Marschak (25) discusses the
rationality of this approach by using examples from both
statistics and business.
As presented by Allais (18), a person chooses between lotter-
ies a1 and a2, and between lotteries a3 and a4, where a1,a 2,a 3, and
a4 are: a1, 1.00 chance of $1,000,000; a2, .10 chance of $5,000,000,
0.89 chance of $1,000,000, and 0.01 chance of $0; a3, 0.10 chance
of $5,000,000, 0.90 chance of $0; and a4, 0.11 chance of
$1,000,000; 0.89 chance of $0.
In this example, if an agent prefers a1 to a2 and a4 to a3, (or
a2 to a1 and a3 to a4), the individual does not violate the
independence axiom and the evidence is consistent with the
agent having indifference curves that are parallel straight lines
(as surmised by EU theory) (this is illustrated pictorially in
refs. 6 and 19). Laboratory experimentation, however, has
shown that agents commonly choose a1 and a3, violating the
independence assumption. To understand the nature of the
paradox, note that the expected value of a1 is $1 million and
the expected value of a2 is $1.39 million. By preferring a1 to a2,
an agent is presumably maximizing EU, not expected value. If
a1  a2, then u (1)  0.1u (5)  0.89u (1)  0.01u (0), implying
that0.11u (1) 0.1u (5) 0.1u (0),whichinturn[adding0.89u
(0) to each side] implies 0.11u (1)  0.89u (0)  0.1u (5) 
0.90u (0). This suggests that an EU-maximizing agent must
prefer a4 to a3. Of course, the expected value of a4 is $110,000,
whereas the expected value of a3 is $500,000, so if the agent is
maximizing expected value, he should in fact prefer a4 to a3.
However, his choice in the first stage is inconsistent with his
choice in the second stage, and thus the paradox emerges.
Experimental Design
Our experimental design is a slightly different example of the
Allais paradox most commonly referred to as the ‘‘common
consequence effect.’’ [Other examples include ‘‘the certainty
effect’’ and the ‘‘Bergen paradox.’’ See Machina (6, 19) or
Thaler (9) for a more in-depth treatment of these cases and the
literature involving independence violations.] In our example,
we ask subjects to make simple lottery choices. We make use
of a straightforward 2  3 experimental design (see Table 1).
Because one important purpose of our research is to explore
whether agents who are professional traders exhibit behavior
in line with EU, we use undergraduate students as our
experimental control group.k Using a between-person exper-
imental design, we include both undergraduate students and
professional traders in two distinct treatments: treatments 1
and 2. In a third treatment, we had a different student group
participate, but had the same 54 traders who participated in
treatments 1 and 2 complete treatment 3. (See Fig. 1 for our
experimental instructions for treatment 3. Instructions for the
other two treatments are similar, with the necessary adjust-
ments.) The traders first took part in treatment 1 or 2
(determined randomly) and then proceeded through some
jAlternative theories to EU that can accommodate the Allais paradox include: Generalized
Expected Utility Theory (19); Rank Dependent Theory (21, 22), and Prospect Theory (23).
However,despitetheirabilitytoaccommodatetheparadox,alltheoriesproducedivergent
predictions in certain cases (24).
kWe refer to all subjects recruited from the CBOT as traders. However, the 54 traders
recruited consisted of locals, brokers, clerks, and exchange employees (e.g., ﬂoor manag-
ers or market reporters) who worked in the open outcry environment. We found no
statistical difference between ﬂoor participant types; therefore, we pool participants and
collectively call them ‘‘traders.’’ Note that this ﬁnding is intuitive because the average
non-local/broker had accumulated 9 years of ﬂoor experience, and many reported to
havehadseveralyearsofexperienceaseitheralocalorbroker.Finally,theaveragetrader
(including non-locals/brokers) was involved with 537 traded contracts daily.
Table 1. Experimental design
Subject type Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
Students 32 32 30
Traders 27 27 54
Data represent sample sizes. Treatment 1 (2) had subjects choosing be-
tweenR1andS1(R2andS2).Treatment3hadsubjectschoosingbetweenR1and
S1 and then R2 and S2, where it was understood that one of the choices would
be carried out for real earnings.
Fig. 1. Experimental instructions for treatment 3 given to traders.
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treatment 3 at the end of the session.l
In treatment 1, subjects were confronted with a simple
one-shot choice question (following Starmer and Sugden (7),
S (R) represents ‘‘safer’’ (‘‘riskier’’) choice): R1, 0.05 chance of
zero winnings, 0.20 chance of winning $10, 0.75 chance of
winning $7.00; S1, $7 with certainty. In treatment 2, the choice
wasoveradifferentpair:R2,0.80chanceofzerowinnings,0.20
chance of winning $10; S2, 0.75 chance of zero winnings, 0.25
chance of winning $7.
In this case, EU theory predicts that if R1 (S1) is chosen
instead of S1 (R1), then R2 (S2) should be chosen instead of S2
(R2). Alternatively, the Allais paradox and several other
decision-making theories predict that subjects will ‘‘switch’’ by
choosing S1 and R2 (see ref. 7). This paradoxical choice has
been termed the ‘‘common consequence effect,’’ and is a
classic form of the Allais paradox.
In treatment 3, subjects were confronted with the two
identical choice questions and informed that they should make
a choice for both questions, but that only one of the questions
would be binding, i.e., carried out for real money. This
treatment, which is commonly referred to as the ‘‘random
payment’’ or ‘‘random lottery’’ procedure in experimental
economics, was used to provide information on whether
subjects use the ‘‘reduction principle,’’ reducing compound
lotteries to simple ones via the calculus of probabilities (see
ref. 20). Under our design the lotteries reduce as follows:
(R1R2)  ($10, 0.20; $7, 0.375; 0, 0.425); (R1S2)  ($10, 0.10;
$7, 0.50; 0, 0.40); (S1R2)  ($10, 0.10; $7, 0.50; 0, 0.40);
(S1S2)  ($7, 0.625; 0, 0.375).
Forexample,thechoicesofR1 andR2 intreatment3provide
$10with20%chance,$7with37.5%chance,and$0with42.5%
chance. In this case, (R1S2) and (S1R2) should be chosen with
equal probability if the reduction principle holds because these
pairs are isomorphic in reduced form. It seems intuitive to us
that, if two options are identical, they will be chosen with equal
probability. We should stress that a test of the reduction
principle relies on this proposition.
Werecruited94subjectsforourstudenttreatmentsfromthe
undergraduate student body at the University of Maryland
(College Park). Each treatment was run in a large classroom
on the College Park campus. To ensure that decisions re-
mained anonymous, the subjects were seated far apart from
each other. The trader subject pool included 54 professional
traders from the CBOT. Each of the trader treatments was run
in a large room on site at the CBOT. As in the case of the
students, communication between the subjects was prohibited
and the traders were seated such that no subject could observe
another individual’s decision (and payoffs).
Before moving to a discussion of the experimental results, a
few noteworthy aspects of our experimental design merit
further consideration. First, all treatments were run with
pencil and paper. After subjects made their decisions and the
lottery results were realized, experimenters circulated to en-
sure that individual payoffs were calculated correctly. Second,
in treatment 3, we varied the order in which the questions were
given with no apparent ordering effect in the results, so we
pooled the data. Third, in the student treatments, the exchange
rate was 1:1 (1 cent for each unit), and in the trader treatments
the exchange rate was 4:1 (4 cents for each unit). Our decision
to quadruple the stakes for traders was based on a detailed
discussion with CBOT officials about trader earnings. How-
ever, we should highlight that all conclusions should be viewed
in light of this technical qualification.
Results
Table 2 provides a summary of our data. Data in the treatment
1 and treatment 2 columns of Table 2 represent the number of
subjects making each choice. For example, in the student
treatment 1 data, 17 subjects chose R1 and 15 subjects chose
S1. In treatment 3, data represent the patterns of choice. For
example, 10R1R2 shows that 10 students chose R1 in the first
question and R2 in the second question.
The major issue at hand is whether subjects’ choices are in
line with the Allais paradox. We examine this question with a
null hypothesis of Pr(R1)  Pr(R2) and with a one-sided
‘‘common consequence effect’’ alternative: Pr(R2)  Pr(R1).
Among students, 17 of 32 (53%) chose R1, whereas 24 of 32
(75%) chose R2. Traders show a preference in a similar
direction: 19 of 27 (70%) chose R1, whereas 24 of 27 (89%)
chose R2. Although these differences are both statistically
significant at the P  0.05 level when a Fischer’s exact test is
used,suggestingthatbothtradersandstudents’behaviorisline
with the Allais paradox, the data pattern does suggest that the
trader population falls prey to the Allais paradox less fre-
quently than the student population.
Our next exploration concerns whether the reduction prin-
ciple holds. In this case, the null hypothesis is that Pr(R1S2) 
Pr(S1R2), and for a common consequence effect to be evi-
dent it must be the case that Pr(S1R2)  Pr(R1S2). In the
student data, 3 of 30 (10%) subjects chose R1S2 and 13 of 30
(43%) subjects chose S1R2, providing strong evidence of the
common consequence effect, and inconsistent with the reduc-
tion conjecture. This result is consonant with Starmer and
Sugden’s (7) results using University of East Anglia (Norfolk,
U.K.) students. Among traders, however, 9 of 54 (17%) chose
R1S2 and only 7 of 54 (13%) chose S1R2. This difference, which
is in the opposite direction of the student results and the
common consequence prediction, is not statistically signifi-
cant, and therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
traders behave according to the reduction principle. Also, the
amount of ‘‘switching’’ for dealers (16 of 54) is less than that
for students (16 of 30), suggesting again that the trader
population falls prey to the Allais paradox less than the student
population.
Concluding Remarks
In this study, we recruited futures and options floor traders
from the CBOT to participate in an experiment involving
choice over risky outcomes. Making use of undergraduate
students as our experimental control group, we find some
evidence that both students and professional traders behave in
accordance with the Allais paradox. However, we find that the
trader population falls prey to the Allais paradox slightly less
frequently than the student population. A few caveats are in
order. First, it is important to note that traders were making
lFor comparability purposes with respect to treatment 3 data, we also ran an experiment
with 46 students that mirrored the trader treatment: these students ﬁrst took part in
treatment1or2(determinedrandomly),proceededthroughsomeunrelatedexperiments
for 1 h, and then participated in treatment 3 at the end of the session. This procedure
produced similar data patterns as those gained from the treatments without learning
possibilities, so we suppress further discussion.
Table 2. Experimental results summary
Subject
type Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
Students 17R1 15S1 24R2 8S2 10R1R2 3R1S2 13S1R2 4S1S2
Traders 19R1 8S1 24R2 3S2 30R1R2 9R1S2 7S1R2 8S1S2
Datarepresentthenumberofsubjectsmakingeachchoice.Forexample,in
the student treatment 1, 17 subjects chose R1 and 15 chose S1. In treatment 3,
data represent the patterns of choice. For example, 10R1R2 shows that 10
students chose R1 in the ﬁrst question and R2 in the second.
















Sdecisions over higher financial stakes. Second, we should
highlight that our findings do not necessarily conflict with
those of previous authors who have found that experienced
marketers do not fall prey to behavioral anomalies. In many of
those cases, subject decision-making was observed in natural
settings in which the agents have experience with the good, the
task, the institution, the environment, etc. In our experimental
design, it may be the case that all of the important design
parameters, even the task, is foreign to the professional
traders, leading to the observed results. A next step in our
research agenda is to explore the comparative static effects of
adding/removing context and observing behavior in/out of the
natural setting.
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